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A. No. 23091. In Bank. 
ELSAN H. STAFFORD, Appellant, v. THE LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT BOARD 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Counties- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pensions.-
Under County Peace Officers' Retirement Law (now codified 
as Gov. Code, §§ 31900-32082), term "beneficiary" is not 
lilllited to one receiving a pension but includes one 
having right to a future retirement allowance, since a contrary 
view would render Gov. Code, § 32081, meaningless and would 
defeat declared policy of § 32080 that disability benefits shall 
not be cumulative with workmen's compensation benefits 
awarded for same disability. 
[2] Id.- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pensions.-With-
holding of pension benefits to member of county peace ofil.cers' 
retirement system until such benefits, otherwise payable, equal 
amount of his workmen's compensation award as is required 
by Gov. Code, §§ 32080, 32081, does not violate workmen's com-
pensation provisions of Lab. Code, § 3751, since all code sec-
tions are basically of equal sanction as enactments of Legis-
ture, and since the Government Code sections, being later in 
time and part of a particular and specific law dealing with 
retirement benefits of county peace officers, must be held to 
prevail if any conflict exists. 
[3] Id.- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pension.-Com-
pliance with Gov. Code, § 32081, withholding pension benefits 
to member of county peace officers' retirement system until 
such benefits, otherwise payable, equal amount of workmen's 
compensation award, will not constitute an exaction or receipt 
by employer from employee of a contribution in violation of 
Lab. Code, § 3751, but may be construed as fixing or defining 
a period during which pension payments will be suspended. 
[ 4] Statutes- Construction- With Reference to Other Laws.-
Every statute should be construed with reference to whole 
system of law of which it is a part so that all may be har-
monized and have effect. 
[1] Vested right of pensioner to pension, notes, 54 A.L.R. 943; 
98 A.L.R. 505; 112 A.L.R. 1009; 137 A.L.R. 249. See, also, Cal. 
Jur., Pensions, § 4; Am.Jur., Pensions, § 24. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 161; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 339 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5] Counties, § 37.1; [ 4] Statutes, 
§ 187. 
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[5] Counties- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pensions.-
Vested rights of member of county peace officers' retirement 
system in his pension are not impaired by retirement board's 
compliance with provisions of Gov. Code, §§ 32080, 32081, re-
quiring withholding of pension benefits until such benefits, 
otherwise payable, equal amount of workmen's compensation 
award, where those provisions were in effect when member 
first became a peace officer and when he was retired. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, .Tudge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel payment of a pension. 
Judgment of dismissal affirmed. 
Elsan H. Stafford, in pro. per., for Appellant. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and 
Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, for Re-
spondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioner, a retired deputy sheriff of 
the County of Los .Angeles, seeks mandamus to compel re-
spondent County Employees' Retirement Board to pay him 
a pension. A general demurrer to his amended petition for 
the writ was sustained without leave to amend, and he appeals 
from the ensuing judgment of dismissal. We have concluded 
that the trial court correctly determined that petitioner is 
not entitled to the payments he seeks, and that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Petitioner alleges that he entered the service of the county 
as a deputy sheriff in August, 1946. He was injured in line 
of duty, and in January, 1950, was retired by reason of re-
sulting disability. In May, 1950, the Industrial Accident 
Commission awarded him $5,603.53, which was paid in a 
lump sum by State Compensation Insurance Fund, the work-
men's compensation insurance carrier for the county. Peti-
tioner thereafter applied to respondent board for payment 
of a pension. .Acting assertedly pursuant to, and in reliance 
upon, the provisions of section 32081 of the Government 
Code, hereinafter (p. 797) quoted in all material parts, the 
board refused to make any payment on account of the pension 
until (using the language of subdivision (a) of section 32081) 
"the total amount of the retirement payments which would 
otherwise be paid equals the total amount received [by peti-
tioner] under the workmen's compensation act.'' 
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Petitioner's pension rights are set forth in the County 
Peace Officers Retirement Law (now codified as Gov. Code, 
§§ 31900-32082), passed by the state in 1931, and adopted by 
Los Angeles County pursuant to the provisions of section 
31930.1 Section 32055 provides that "Upon retirement of 
a member for service connected disability, he shall receive 
an annual pension, payable in monthly installments, equal 
to one-half of his terminal salary, not to exceed two hundred 
fifty dollars ( $250) a month." Section 32080 declares that 
"It is the intention of this chapter [the Retirement Law] 
that pensions allowed for injury incurred in line of duty 
shall not be cumulative with the benefits under workmen's 
compensation awarded for the same injury or disability." 
Section 32081, hereinbefore referred to and relied upon by 
respondent board, provides that "If any beneficiary receives 
compensation under any workmen's compensation act or by 
virtue of any judgment obtained against the county . . . for 
disability arising out of and in the course of the employment of 
a member or pensioner, the benefits shall be modified as follows: 
"(a) If the amount is paid in one sum ... the beneficiary 
shall not receive any retirement payments until the total 
amount of the retirement payments which would otherwise 
be paid equals the total amount received under the workmen's 
compensation act or by virtue of the judgment . . . " 
[1] Petitioner first contends that section 32081 does not 
apply to him because section 31908 states that" 'Beneficiary' 
means any person in receipt of a pension, or other benefit 
provided by the retirement system.'' Since, says petitioner, 
he has not yet received a pension he is not a beneficiary 
as that term is used in section 32081. However, section 31903 
declares that "Unless the context otherwise requires, the 
definitions and general provisions contained in this article 
govern the construction of this chapter." It seems clear 
that the context of section 32081 requires that petitioner be 
included within the term "beneficiary," as otherwise the 
entire section would appear to apply to no one and to be 
meaningless. It is not to be assumed that the Legislature 
indulged in an idle act. (Scheas v. Robertson (1951), 38 
· Cal.2d 119, 129 [238 P.2d 982] ; see also Stafford v. Realty 
1Government Code, section 31930: "This chapter shall become ef-
fective in any county upon its acceptance by ordinance passed by four-
fifths vote of its board of supervisors. and becomes operative in the 
county on .January 1st or .July 1st following the expiration of three 
months after the passage. of the ordinance.'' 
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Bond Service Corp. (1952), 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [249 P.2d 
241].) ::V1oreover, a view would defeat the de-
<;]ared policy of sedion 32080 that disability pensions shall 
not be cumulative with workmen's compensation benefits 
avvarded for the same disability In addition, as pointed 
out by respondent, the right to a future retirement allowance 
has been held to be a "benefit" Palaske v. City of Long 
Beach (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 120, 124-127 [208 P.2d 764] ), 
thus bringing petitioner within the section 31908 definition 
of "beneficiary" as one who is in receipt of some "other 
benefit provided by the retirement system.'' 
Petitioner also contends that because he contributed 
to the fund from which his pension is to be paid, the result 
of the withholding of pension benefits from him until such 
benefits, otherwise payable, equal the amount of his work-
men's compensation award is to cause him to contribute to 
the cost of such award, in violation of the provisions of 
section 3751 of the Labor Code.2 This contention likewise is 
untenable as applied to the facts of this case. In the first 
place, both section 3751 of the Labor Code and sections 32080 
and 32081 of the Government Code (pursuant to which the 
pension payments are being withheld) are basically of equal 
sanction as enactments of the Legislature. Section 31902 
of the Government Code expressly declares that the Retire-
ment Law ''shall not be construed as a local measure.'' The 
Workmen's Compensation Act, including the provisions upon 
which Labor Code section 3751 is based, was enacted in 1913. 
The Retirement Law, including the provisions of Govern-
ment Code sections 32080 and 32081, was enacted in 1931. 
Therefore, if it be deemed that a conflict exists between 
the provisions of the Labor Code section and those of sections 
32080 and 32081, the latter sections, being later in time, must 
be held to prevail. (Nelson v. Reilly (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d 
303, 306 f198 P .2d 694].) Also, since the Retirement I~aw 
is a particular and specific law, dealing with the retire-
ment benefits of county peace officers, its provisions must be 
held to prevail over the general workmen's compensation pro-
visions expressed in section 3751 of the Labor Code. (See 
Board of Supervisors v. Simpson ) , 36 Cal.2d 671, 673 
f227 P.2d ; Rose v. State of (1942), 19 Cal.2d 
2Labor Code, section 3751: ''No employer shall exact or receive from 
any employee any contribution, or mnke or take any deduction from the 
earnings of any employee either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole 
or any part of the cost of compensation under this division. Violation 
of this section is a misdemeanor." 
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WhitfemoTe v. (1946), 
.2d 212]; 23 CaLTur. 
lt appears, however, tlmt there is no (~onfiic:t between 
the two statutory and that with section 
32081 of the Government Code will not constitute an exaction 
or receipt by the employer from the employee of a contribu-
tion, in violation of Labor Code section 3751. Rather, section 
32081 may be construed as fixing or defining a period during 
which pension payments will be [4] "[E]very 
statute shonld be construed with reference to the whole system 
of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and 
have effect. [Citations.]" (Stafford v. Realty Bond Service 
Corp. (1952), supra, 39 Cal.2d 797, 805; see also Rose v. 
State of California (1942), s~tpra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 724; 23 Cal. 
,Jnr. 784-785, and cases there cited.) .Although this construction 
may be considered to re:mlt in a reduction in the amount of 
pension payments vvhieh the retired officer would otherwise re-
eeive, it may be noted that under the terms of section 32064 of 
the Government Code a reduction (even complete termina-
tion, prior to amendment of the provision in 1947) may also 
occur if the officer engages in public employment other than 
service in the armed forces of the United States. 
Cases relied upon by petitioner are neither compelling nor 
persuasive to a contrary holding. Larson v. Board of Police 
etc. Cornmrs. (1945), 71 Cal..App.2d 60, 62 [162 P.2d 33]; 
Johnson v. Board of Police etc. Pension Com mrs. ( 1946), 
74 Cal..App.2d 919, 921 [170 P.2d 48]; and Holt v. Board 
of Police etc. Commrs. (1948), 86 Cal..App.2d 714, 719-720 
[196 P.2d 94], all deal with a section of the Long Beach city 
charter which stated that "This provision is intended to be 
in lien of and take the place, in so far as it applies, of the 
\Vorkmen 's Compensation, Insurance and Safety .Act ... 
and any person who would be entitled to a pension under 
the provisions of this amendment and who applies for a 
pension hereunder shall be deemed to have waived all provi-
sions under the -workmen's Compensation, Insurance and 
Safety .Act ... " (See p. 62 of 71 Cal.App.2d.) It was 
held that the charter provision, a matter of local concern, 
could not constitute the pension provisions a substitute for 
workmen's compensation. .As pointed out in the Holt case 
(p. 719 of 86 Cal.App.2d), however, the charter did not 
provide that workmen's compensation was to be in lieu of 
and take the place of the pension provisions, and none of 
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the cited eases passes upon such a situation. v. Ind·us~ 
trial Ace. Com. , 41 Cal.2d 118, 121 [258 P.2d 1], 
concerns a Los Angeles charter that if an 
employee entitled to a pension because of injury is granted 
workmen's compensation, then his pension should be con-
strued as such compensation and in payment of the 
award. The city was permissibly uninsured for workmen's 
compensation. It was held that the general workmen's com-
pensation law must prevail over the local charter provision 
in case of conflict between the two, and that "the validity 
of'' any credit given the city against the workmen's compen-
sation award ''depends upon whether Healy contributed to 
the pension for which the credit was allowed and whether 
as a result of the credit he was required, directly or indirectly, 
to pay part of the cost of his compensation in violation of 
section 3751" of the Labor Code. However, as already 
noted, in the case presently before us the retirement law 
provision under which defendant acted is a part of general 
state law rather than a local charter provision, and the pay-
ments which are deferred or reduced are those of the pension 
rather than of the compensation award. An Alameda city 
ordinance which was construed to likewise require reduction 
of pension payments in case of payment of workmen's com-
pensation was upheld against a similar contention of conflict 
with the workmen's compensation act, in Foster v. Pension 
Board (1937), 23 Cal.App.2d 550, 554-555 [73 P.2d 631]. 
Other contentions by petitioner are without merit and 
appear to have been abandoned by him. [5] For example, 
it was suggested that his vested rights in his pension were 
in some manner impaired by defendant's compliance with 
the provisions of section 32080 and 32081 of the Government 
Code. However, those provisions were in effect both when 
petitioner first became a deputy sheriff and when he was 
retired; consequently his pension rights were neither altered 
nor impaired during or after his service for the county. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Bray, J. protem.,* 
concurred. 
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority holding requires an employee to contribute 
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieial Couneil. 
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to workmen's compensation payable to him contrary to the 
eonstitutional and statutory policy of this state. It is of 
little consequenee that the payments of disability pension 
are to be withheld up to the amount of the workmen's com-
pensation received by the employee rather than that the 
pension was credited against the compensation as was the 
case in Healy v. Industrial Ace. Com., 41 Cal.2d 118 [258 
P.2d 1]. That involved merely a matter of time and method 
of accomplishing the illegal result. Under the pension law 
the county employee was required to and did contribute to 
the pension fund. Now that contribution is taken from him 
because he has received workmen's compensation, that is, 
payment of his pension to which he contributed is withheld 
because he received workmen's compensation. He is, in 
effect, and for all practical purposes, paying part of the 
workmen's compensation to which he is entitled without 
contribution by him. 
The policy of this state envisions no such contribution. 
The Constitution provides for a complete system of workmen's 
compensation. ''The Legislature is hereby expressly vested 
with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this Con-
stitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of work-
men's compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that 
behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part of any 
or all persons to compensate any or all of their workmen 
for injury or disability, and their dependents for death in-
curred or sustained by the said workmen in the course of 
their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party. A 
complete system of workmen's compensation includes ade-
quate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and gen-
eral welfare of any and all workmen and those dependent 
upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the 
conseqttences of any in}ttry or death incurred or sustained 
by workmen in the course of their employment, irrespective 
of the fault of any party; also full provision for securing 
safety in places of employment; . . . full provision for ade-
quate insurance coverage against liability to pay or furnish 
compensation; . . . all of which matters are expressly de-
clared to be the social public policy of this State, binding 
upon all departments of the State government." (Cal. Const., 
art. XX, § 21 ; emphasis added.) The Legislature has im-
plemented this policy by providing that: "No employer 
shall exact or receive from any employee any contribution, 
42 C.2d-26 
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or make or take any deduction from the earnings of any 
either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole 
of the cost of eompensation under this division. 
of this section is a misdemeanor." (Lab. Code, 
§ 3751.) And: "Liability for compensation shall not be 
reduced or affected by any insurance, contribution or other 
benefit whatsoever due to or received by the person entitled 
to such compensation, except as otherwise provided by this 
division." (Lab. Code, § 3752.) Nothing could be more 
specific than the last quoted provision. Contrary to the 
majority opinion it is more specific than the pension law 
(Gov. Code, § 31900 et seq.) and if there is a conflict, it 
controls. 
California Jurisprudence, after referring to sections 3751 
and 3752 of the Labor Code, states: "Accordingly contribu-
tions or benefits received from a labor union during a strike 
may not be deducted from the disability indemnity payable 
under the act. And when the employer takes out accident 
insurance in favor of the employee, out of whose wages the 
premiums are eventually payable, such workman is entitled 
to the benefits under the policy in addition to those to which 
he is entitled under the statute, and the employer may not 
set off against compensation due from him any amounts paid 
under the policy." (27 Cal.Jur. 513.) The rule is settled 
that the payment of salary or wages does not prevent an 
award of workmen's compensation for disability and the 
salary is not to be deducted from the compensation unless 
there is express provision therefor. (Department of Motor 
Vehicles v. IndttstTial Ace. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d 131] .) 
The pension act cannot, under the Constitution (art. XX, 
§ 21, supra) require that the employee contribute toward the 
payment of his compensation. As seen, that constitutional 
provision states that it is the policy of this state that there 
shall be a liability on the part of employers to pay compen-
sation to their employees; that the employee shall be relieved 
of the consequences of an industrial injury. If the employee 
has to contribute to the payment of his workmen's compensa-
tion the employer is to that extent not liable and the employee 
to that extent has not been relieved of the consequences of 
the injury. The underlying principle of a complete system 
of workmen's compensation which is the constitutionally de-
clared policy of this state is that compensation for injuries 
shall be borne by industry as a part of the cost of production. 
(Union Iron Wks. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 190 Cal. 33 [210 
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P. 410) ; Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 179 Cal. 432 [177 P. 273); Western Metal Supply Co. 
v. Pillsbu1·y, 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491, Ann.Cas. 1917 E 390]; 
Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [151 P. 
398].) It must necessarily follow that no contributions to 
the payment of workmen's compensation can be required of 
the employee. 'l'herefore the pension act cannot constitution-
ally require such contribution. If it is argued that there is 
no contribution but only less pension payable to the employee, 
then what becomes of the contribution to the pension fund 
by the employee? Either the portion he supplied is taken 
away from him or he is required to help pay the workmen's 
compensation which he is entitled to receive without contri-
bution and in either case he has been deprived of at least a 
portion of that to which he is lawfully entitled under the 
workmen's compensation law. It seems clear to me that if 
the Legislature may provide, in the face of article XX, sec-
tion 21, of the Constitution, that an injured employee who 
receives workmen's compensation may be barred from receiv-
ing a pension from a fund to which he has contributed, it 
may also bar him from receiving payments under a policy 
of health and accident insurance on which he has paid all 
the premiums, or from receiving other benefits from welfare 
agencies to which he has made contributions in order to secure 
such benefits. Under the majority holding here such legisla-
tion would be upheld. In my opinion it would violate the 
above cited constitutional mandate. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied .Tune 9, 
l!JM. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
